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708 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 
plausible, then Mothersill's conception of beauty needs an adjust- 
ment. Even if that is true, the book remains valuable from start to 
finish, and I am pleased to recommend it. 
TED COHEN 
University of Chicago 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. RICHARD RORTY. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989. xvi, 201 p. Cloth $34.50, 
paper $10.95. 
Each of the words in the title names a major theme of this book. It 
begins with accounts of what Richard Rorty calls vocabularies, of 
truth and of language in general. Examples of alternative vocabu- 
laries-Rorty also calls them language-games-are "the vocabulary 
of ancient Athenian politics versus Jefferson's, the moral vocabulary 
of Saint Paul versus Freud's, the jargon of Newton versus that of 
Aristotle, the idiom of Blake versus that of Dryden." Of these, Rorty 
says that they are not made true or false by "the world" (5). Truth is 
not a relationship of representation between a set of descriptions in 
such a vocabulary and something else-reality, the world, or what- 
ever. "To say that Freud's vocabulary gets at the truth about human 
nature, or Newton's at the truth about the heavens" is to pay "an 
empty compliment" of the kind "traditionally paid to writers whose 
novel jargon we have found useful" (8). 
Vocabularies are useful sets of metaphors adopted or discarded 
insofar as they serve purposes that engage "us." Such changes do not 
involve criteria or choice. "Europe did not decide to accept the idiom 
of Romantic poetry, or of socialist politics, or of Galilean mechanics. 
. Rather, Europe gradually lost the habits of using certain words 
and gradually acquired the habit of using others" (7). 
This understanding of vocabularies as useful sets of metaphors is 
presented as deriving from a view of language in general attributed 
to Ludwig Wittgenstein and Donald Davidson. What we are to learn 
from Rorty's Wittgenstein and Rorty's Davidson seems to be: that 
"there is no fixed task for language to perform" (13), that alternative 
vocabularies are like alternative tools with different uses (11-13), 
and that language is the contingent product of blind evolution. 
What then is each of us to make of the particular language that he 
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or she has inherited? We are to remake ourselves, using Harold 
Bloom's conception of "the strong poet" and Friedrich Nietzsche's 
of the will to self-overcoming, but these somewhat aristocratic con- 
ceptions are to be democratized by invoking Sigmund Freud, a 
Freud who showed that everyone has the same unconscious need as 
the strong poet, to remake his or her own self by redescribing in his 
or her own terms that tissue of contingencies that his or her past 
provided. 
The final vocabulary of any person is that in which long-term 
projects are formulated, deep hopes and fears are expressed, and the 
story of one's life is told. It is final in that its use cannot be defended 
against rivals by noncircular arguments. The ideal citizen of a liberal 
society-and Rorty presents the vocabulary of self-creation as what 
liberal societies now need-will be what Rorty calls an ironist in 
respect of his or her final vocabulary. Rorty's ironist uses one partic- 
ular final vocabulary, but is aware of alternative vocabularies and 
experiences consequent doubts about his or her own, recognizing 
both that no rational argument can settle the issues between rival 
vocabularies or allay his or her doubts, and that his or her own 
vocabulary is not "closer to reality than others" (73). The ironist 
takes as moral adviser a type of literary critic who has learned that the 
importance of G. W. F. Hegel, S0ren Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche is 
that they helped to "de-cognitivize, de-metaphysicize philosophy" 
(79) and so enabled us to read philosophical texts as literary texts, 
reading in illuminating juxtaposition authors hitherto treated as lit- 
erary with others hitherto treated as philosophical, so that we revise 
our vocabulary and in so doing revise our own moral identity. "Lit- 
erary criticism does for ironists what the search for universal moral 
principles does for metaphysicians" (80). 
One central task is to foster not only appreciation of the tasks of 
self-creation in private life, but also what Rorty takes to be a pecul- 
iarly liberal abhorrence of cruelty in public life, particularly by sen- 
sitizing to hitherto unnoticed types of cruelty and humiliation. Our 
obligations are not founded upon rationally defensible universal 
principles; they express our social solidarities and arise from forms 
of practice in which we participate. Where in the philosophy of 
language Rorty had invoked Wittgenstein and Davidson, in moral 
philosophy he invokes Michael Oakeshott and Wilfrid Sellars. And 
where, in extending his account of the tasks of self-creation through 
innovations of vocabulary, he appealed to Marcel Proust, Nietzsche, 
Martin Heidegger, and Jacques Derrida, here he appeals to Vladimir 
Nabokov and George Orwell. 
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Thus summarized, Rorty's impressive themes plainly need long 
and detailed spelling out. They do not receive it in this book, written 
as it is in intellectual shorthand whose compressions, allusions, and 
flag-waving, signposting rhetorical style make it too easy a victim for 
any initially unsympathetic reader. Far too much work is left to the 
reader: there are argumentative gaps to be filled, places where every- 
thing turns on the detail, but detail is absent, incoherences to be 
resolved. Three questions stand out. 
The first concerns the true place, of justificatory philosophical 
argument in Rorty's constructions. On the one hand, he abjures it: 
philosophers should not be asked for arguments against the views 
that Rorty rejects, for such arguments are bound to be question- 
begging (8-9); "I am not going to offer arguments against the vocab- 
ulary I want to replace" (9); "the ironist thinks that such arguments 
are . . . useful as expository devices, but in the end not much more 
than ways of getting people to change their practices without admit- 
ting that they have done so" (78). On the other hand, at key points 
Rorty uses what he elsewhere abjures. He quotes and extends an 
argument of Davidson about what must be involved in any substan- 
tial change in our views or values (49); he treats Freud's views as 
well-founded (31-2); and he argues sporadically against the thesis 
that it is possible to identify conditions of possibility for types of 
judgment or experience (e.g., 125). 
Secondly, it is not clear how we should understand Rorty's account 
of the ironist's final vocabulary. What is it about such vocabularies 
that deprives them of the possibility of noncircular justification and 
of rational defeat at the hands of their rivals? On this Rorty is silent. 
Yet rival incommensurable schemes of thought and practice have 
sometimes developed in ways that made it rational by the standards 
of either to discard one and adopt the other. And there are well- 
known arguments supporting the conclusion that beliefs that cannot 
be defeated somehow or other fail the test of rationality. Rorty 
doubtless takes these considerations to be irrelevant. But we need to 
learn why. 
Finally, Rorty's ambivalence about philosophical argument 
renders quite unclear the point of his appeals to Wittgenstein, Da- 
vidson, and others. He cannot, it seems, be offering us grounds 
drawn from their theories; but if he is offering us their conclusions 
detached from any rational grounds, why should we be interested? 
This difficulty is aggravated by the way he rewrites his culture heroes 
in the course of invoking them: Rorty's Wittgenstein means by 'lan- 
guage-games' something notably different from what Wittgenstein 
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meant; Rorty's Freud is a perspectivalist, unlike Freud himself; and 
Rorty admits to having reinvented Hegel. This multiplication of fic- 
tions suggests that Rorty's present attitudes will find adequate ex- 
pression only in some genre more remote from those of both tradi- 
tional and contemporary philosophy than he is here prepared to 
recognize. Inside these didactic expositions there is perhaps a novel 
pleading to be let out. 
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE 
University of Notre Dame 
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences. NELSON 
GOODMAN and CATHERINE Z. ELGIN. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub- 
lishing Company, 1988. xiv, 174 p. Cloth $21.50.* 
This welcome book consists of ten chapters, five by Nelson Good- 
man, three by Catherine Z. Elgin, and the rest, jointly authored. 
Both in substance and in elegance of style, the work is clearly the 
result of extensive collaboration. Although the chapters can stand on 
their own-and indeed, each of them, save one, is eventually to be 
published elsewhere-together they display a rich thematic and ar- 
gumentative unity. 
The seven chapters in "Part Two: Exploration" apply and advance 
Goodman's theory of symbolism as first offered in Languages of 
Art.' They range over a wide variety of topics, including meaning and 
reference in architecture, the identity of works, the concept of varia- 
tion in the arts, imagery in psychology, comparisons between lin- 
guistic and pictorial competence, the conditions for representation, 
and distinctions between facts and conventions, analog and digital 
systems, and the pictorial and verbal. 
Where there is a notational system permitting works of art to be 
identified syntactically or semantically, the works are "allographic." 
In particular, texts are allographic, so that, in chapter III, Goodman 
and Elgin argue that many interpretations of a text are multiple 
interpretations of the same work. For the text can be precisely iden- 
tified independently of an interpretation or version. 
* My thanks to Catherine Elgin and Nelson Goodman for their comments, which 
saved me from a number of errors and misreadings. 
' Indianapolis: Hackett, 1968, 2nd ed. 
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